Throughout the four phases in semiconductor production, there are several critical material and equipment inputs that pose additional supply chain challenges.

The following table provides a summarized assessment of several of the critical inputs in the semiconductor supply chain. Phases highlighted in blue are those in which the U.S. has secure domestic capabilities while phases highlighted in red are those in which U.S. capabilities are minimal and vulnerable.

Multiple critical minerals, critical metals, and rare earth elements (REEs) are required for the various components of semiconductors, and many of the supplies for these minerals are dominated by China. China controls 80% of the world’s REE supply for which the U.S. is 100% import-dependent. Currently, the U.S. imports 80% of REE directly from China, while remaining portions are indirectly sourced from China through other countries. Other critical minerals for semiconductors include:

Germanium: • U.S. import-dependence: >50%• U.S. import sources: China (58%), Belgium (21%), Germany (10%), Russia (8%), and other (3%)

Gallium:• U.S. import-dependence: 100% • U.S. import sources: China (55%), UK (11%), Germany (10%), and other (24%)

Arsenic: • U.S. import-dependence: 100% • U.S. import sources: China (58%), Morocco (38%), Belgium (2%), and other (2%)

Copper:• U.S. import-dependence: 30%• U.S. import sources: China (59%), Canada (24%), and Mexico (11%)

Therefore, regardless of downstream production or manufacturing capabilities, the U.S. will still rely on China for several of the key raw materials necessary for semiconductors.

Another key raw material for semiconductors is polysilicon which is used to make the silicon ingot that is sliced into wafers. Semiconductors require ultrahigh purity polysilicon which is 1,000 times purer than the level required for solar panels and produced by just four companies globally. China accounts for approximately 79% of raw silicon (2016) and controls the production capacity for over 75% of global polysilicon production, compared to the U.S.’ 9%.

Once the polysilicon is produced, it must be turn into thin disk-shaped silicon wafers used in the chip manufacturing process. Global wafer production is dominated by Japan (56%), Taiwan (16%), Germany (14%), and South Korea (10%). China controls less than 5% while the U.S. has no wafer production capacity.

Photomasks and photoresists are materials that contain and imprint the circuit pattern on the wafers. The photomask market is controlled by Japan (53%), the U.S. (40%), and Taiwan (7%). The photoresist market is dominated by Japan (90%) with the U.S. and South Korea making up the remaining 10%.

Approximately 49 different gases are used throughout the semiconductor production process, with U.S., Japanese, French, and South Korean firms controlling half of the overall market for these gases. 60% of the global market for the wet chemicals required in semiconductor manufacturing is controlled by U.S., German, and Japanese firms.

Due to the highly complex and technical nature of producing semiconductors, advanced equipment, tools, and machinery is required throughout the process. The U.S. and its allies control the supply chain for this manufacturing equipment while China possesses virtually no capacity to make this advanced equipment.

Manufacturing/Fabrication Equipment: The U.S. dominates the supply chain for equipment used the manufacturing/fabrication production phase, controlling 41.7% of the global market, followed by Japan (31.1%) and the Netherlands (18.8%). U.S. firms control the majority market shares for five of the major manufacturing processing equipment categories (deposition tool, dry/wet etch and cleaning, doping equipment, process controls, and testers). However, the production of the lithography equipment is concentrated in the Netherlands and Japan, with Dutch firm ASML the only firm in the world that produces EUV lithography machines necessary to manufacture advanced chips less than 7nm.

Packaging Equipment: For the equipment used in the packaging phase of the semiconductor production, the U.S. has a market share of just 4.9% compared to Japan’s 35.7%, China’s 22.9%, and the Netherlands’ 11.1%.

Testing Equipment: The U.S. and Japan lead the global production of equipment used in in the testing production phase, with 33.5% (U.S.) and 48.65% (Japan) of the global market share.

However, while the production of much of this equipment is concentrated with U.S., Japanese, and Dutch firms, each of these pieces of equipment is highly complex and requires extensive material inputs. Therefore, each piece of equipment has its own complex global supply chain with further complicates the security of supply chains for the semiconductor end product.

Rather than a new currency, CBDC is a form of central bank electronic money that could be used by households and businesses to make payments. A report by the Bank for International Settlements states that, although the term "central bank digital currency" is not well-defined, "it is envisioned by most to be a new form of central bank money [...] that is different from balances in traditional reserve or settlement accounts.".[4]

The present concept of CBDCs differs from virtual currency and cryptocurrency in that a CBDC is or would be issued by a state.[4][5][6][7] Most CBDC implementations will likely not use or need any sort of distributed ledger such as a blockchain.[8][9][10]

In 2023, the central banks of 114 countries accounting for 95% of the world’s GDP were said to be in various stages of evaluating the launch of a national digital currency.[11][12] These included the ECB, the UK, and the US.[13][14] China's digital RMB was the first digital currency to be issued by a major economy.[15][16] Five central banks have launched a CBDC: the Central Bank of The Bahamas (Sand Dollar), the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (DCash), the Central Bank of Nigeria (e-Naira), the Bank of Jamaica (JamDex), People's Bank of China (Digital renminbi) and the Reserve Bank of India (Digital Rupee).[17] The ECB/Eurozone is preparing decision by end of 2023, following a study phase since 2021 regarding the possibilities of a digital euro.

Some states have also issued, or have considered issuing, cryptocurrencies: these include Venezuela (Petro) and the Marshall Islands (Sovereign). These cryptocurrencies are often considered with the intent of increasing a state's independence from global financial systems, such as by reducing dependence on a foreign currency or by evading international sanctions.[18][19]

Contrasting attitudes towards digital currencies were demonstrated by developments in the UK and Switzerland in February 2023. The UK Treasury and the Bank of England said a state-backed digital pound was likely to be launched some time after 2025. Two weeks later, a Swiss lobby group triggered a national vote on maintaining a "sufficient quantity" of cash in circulation over fears that electronic payments make it easier for the state to monitor its citizens' actions.[20] In a comment on the British government’s plans, the BBC's Faisal Islam said the issue was about access to the data attached to every spending transaction, and whether people might choose to trust a global company more than the state: "The eye here is on maintaining UK monetary sovereignty against upheaval from the likes of Big Tech."[21]